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Harmonization, But Not Homogenization: The
Case for Cuban Autonomy in Globalizing
Economic Reforms
HEATHER E. SHREVE*
ABSTRACT
Since 1959, Cuba has been an anomaly in the Western Hemisphere.
From its fierce isolationism to its steadfast commitment to-communism
and Fidel Castro, the Cuban model shunned many modern conventions
and developments of the increasingly globalized world. However, in the
last decade, subtle shifts in Cuban governance and control led some
scholars to question if and how Cuba could participate in the modern,
global economy. President Razil Castro answered the speculation in late
2010 with an announcement regarding Cuban economic modernization
and, again, in 2011, as significant economic reforms were implemented.
All of these changes beg the ultimate question: Can Cuba engage and
interact with the global economy and remain a Marxist-Leninist
philosophy, or is an irreversible, fundamental homogenization required?
This Note argues that, based on the basic principles of globalization, it is
possible for Cuba to enter the globalized economy and to harmonize,
rather than homogenize, their economic policies with those of other
countries while retaining its Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Globalization
unavoidably and transformatively requires all global actors to
harmonize their policies but does not require homogenization or
uniformity.
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, when asked by a reporter about the value of spreading the
Cuban model to other countries, Fidel Castro responded, "[tihe Cuban
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model doesn't even work for us anymore."' This statement, while
certainly an offhand remark from the revolutionary Cuban leader, is, at
minimum, an acknowledgment of Cuba's difficulties over the last
decade. As interpreted by some commentators, Castro's statement was
an "acknowledgement that under 'the Cuban model' the state has much
too big a role in the economic life of the country."2 Shortly after the
publication of Fidel Castro's remark, Cuban President Ratil Castro
announced that the National Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba
would convene in April 2011 after a fourteen-year hiatus to "make
fundamental decisions on how to modernize the Cuban economic model
and adopt the paths for economic and social policy of the party and the
revolution."3
These two events culminate years of economic struggle and recent
structural economic reforms in Cuba, including plans to lay off a half-
million state workers; to allow citizens to start private businesses as
employers hiring employees; 4 and to reduce the government's role in
financing free education, free health care, and nearly free housing.5
Based on these developments, it could be speculated that Cuba, the last
stronghold of purely Marxist-Leninist ideology and structure, must
finally conform and liberalize its economic policies to join the globalized
economy after almost sixty years of isolationism. While it seems that
economic liberalization is an unlikely end result, the proposed economic
reforms are significant, as it was once thought that such change could
only occur after intense structural alternations to the Cuban ideological
model.6
Larry CatA Backer, a professor of law at Pennsylvania State
University, provides an important perspective on the possibility of a
1. Jeffrey Goldberg, Fidel: 'Cuban Model Doesn't Even Work for Us Anymore', ATLANTIC
(Sept. 8, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/internationallarchive/2010/09/fidel-
cuban-model-doesn't-even-workfor-us-anymore/6202/.
2. Id. (noting the comment of Julia Sweig, an eminent Latin American scholar at the
Council on Foreign Relations, with whom Goldberg traveled to meet Castro).
3. Cuba to Hold Party Congress to Chart Path for Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2010,
at A9.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. In the proceeding months to the publication of this Note, the Cuban government has
undertaken a series of planned reforms, including, but not limited to allowing limited private
property ownership and the continued expansion of controlled self-employment. See, e.g.,
Damien Cave, Cuba to Allow Buying and Selling of Property, With Few Restrictions, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2011, at A4; Nick Miroff, Entrepreneurs Emerge As Cuba Loosens Control, NPR
(Sept. 20, 2011), available at http://www.npr.org/2011/09/20/140501399/entrepreneurs-emerge-
as-cuba-loosens-control. Nevertheless, these reforms do not undermine the central thesis of this
Note, as explored below, as the continuation, expansion, and longevity of further reform is yet
unknown.
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globalized Cuba. In 2004, Backer published a paper in which he
considered whether Cuba could "remain true to its Marxist-Leninist
principles of political and economic organization, and simultaneously
embrace the emerging system of economic globalization."7 Ultimately,
Backer concluded that, while globalization is likely inevitable for Cuba,8
the state cannot and will not embrace it without "ambitious reform,"
including an abandonment of the "inflexibility"'0 of the foundational
system of Cuba-the Cuban model of Marxist-Leninist principles, or
"Fidelismo."11
In the seven years since the publication of Backer's article, Cuba
experienced drastic political, cultural, and economic changes; among the
most notable is the change in leadership in July 2006 from Fidel
Castro,12 the bedrock of the Cuban revolution and the visionary of the
Marxist-Leninist state, to Radl Castro, his younger, more open-minded
brother. Under the leadership of Rail Castro, the government enacted
structural and ideological reforms and opened up dialogue regarding the
future of Cuba. For example, the government is more welcoming of
foreign investment, wage changes, instituting a singular form of
currency, and, most recently, self-employment and cooperative
ownership of businesses.'3 In addressing these changes, some suggest
China as a possible source of inspiration;14 meanwhile, the Cuban
government remains staunchly independent, stating that "[t]he official
mantra is that rather than copying any foreign model, policy changes
will comprise 'a Cuban response to the Cuban reality."'15 With a
patchwork of economic changes enacted and the guidelines from the
April 2011 little more than the proposed changes upon which to
speculate until April 2011, the motivation and the ultimate product of
these reforms fascinate those on the outside.
7. Larry Cati Backer, Cuban Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: Cuban
Marxism, Private Economic Collectives, and Free Market Globalism, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 337, 338 (2004).
8. Id. at411.
9. Id. at 417.
10. Id. at 386.
11. Id. at 390, 413.
12. Rail's Talking Cure: Pointers to a Coming Liberalisation, EcONOMIST, Oct. 25,
2007, available at http://www.economist.com/node/10026212 [hereinafter Raul's Talking
Cure].
13. Id.
14. See Cuba Inspired by China's Economic Reform, Top Official Says, Fox NEWS
LATINO (Nov. 24, 2010), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2010/11/24/cuba-inspired-
chinas-economic-reform-official-says/ [hereinafter Cuba Inspired by China's Economic
Reform].
15. Id.
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In response to these changes, some commentators argue that with
such large, sweeping changes, Cuba is coming to terms with the failure
of its Marxist-Leninist16 form of governance and will exchange it for the
Chinese Maoist model of a "socialist market economy,"17 or will start to
take steps to establish democracy and free trade in Cuba.'8 These
arguments, while certainly interesting, fail to take into account two
possible factors: first, that rather than a sign of defeat and an embrace
of a new ideology, the change in Cuba is a reaction borne of necessity in
the globalizing world, and second, that fiercely autonomous Cuba will
not adopt a model of governance contrary to its very ideology and core,
such as the market socialism and neoliberal models. Instead, Cuba is
attempting to carve out its own niche within the realm of globalization
on its own terms.
Although the end result of the Cuban economic reforms remains
unknown, Cuba serves as an illustration of the limitless flexibility of
globalization to create linkages, interplay, and engagement between the
global economy and the state-even an ideological state that would be
thought to resist globalization. In short, Cuba's economic reforms buck
the assumption of many theorists that Cuba could not or would not
globalize and show that, in globalization, the state reconfigures itself to
be a global actor and to engage in various models of engagement. No
state is immune from globalization; however, not all states must
globalize in the same model.
16. Hallmarks of Marxist-Leninist governance are the following:
The first . .. is one of national security: the power of the state must be
consolidated and increased in order to discourage the enemies of
socialism from attacking the Soviet regime and to assure peaceful co-
existence between nations. Soviet law has, in addition, the economic
task of developing production on the basis of socialist principles so as
to create the abundance which alone will enable everyone to be
supplied "according to his needs." The third task of Soviet law is one of
education: that is, to destroy in Man those tendencies to selfish and
antisocial behavior that are the heritage of centuries of poor economic
organization.
REN9 DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 176 (2d
ed. 1978).
17. The Chinese Maoist model differs from the traditional Marxist-Leninist in that
"[c]itizens, along with the state (representing the collective), can now both engage in
economic activity, subject always to the right of the state to intervene." Backer, supra note
7, at 376.
18. Radl the Pragmatist: Bold Changes Intended to Preserve Cuban Communism May
Herald the Beginning of its End, EcONOMIST, Nov. 11, 2010, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/17463463 [hereinafter Radl the Pragmatist] ("In the
meantime, [Castro's] new boldness represents an opportunity for those who hope that
Cuba will eventually join the rest of Latin America in accepting democracy and the
market economy, for once the market's green shoots appear they tend to flourish.").
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Globalization, in short, is a transformative process by which forces
at all levels, from local to international, exert pressure on the decision-
making process of states to harmonize with the policies and the
practices of other countries; however, while this results in similarities,
globalization is not homogenization. Therefore, it is possible for Cuba to
enter the globalized economy and to harmonize their economic policies
with those of other countries while retaining its Marxist-Leninist
philosophy.
The purpose of this Note is to illustrate that an ideological state,
such as Cuba, can play a role in a globalized world by reconfiguring
itself into an involved global actor-albeit an actor who may operate
differently in the global forum. Part I provides background information
on globalization, Cuba, and the 2004 work of Larry Cati Backer
regarding globalization in Cuba. Part II considers fundamental changes
in Cuba and the global economy since 2004 that surround the
implementation of Cuban reform policies. Part III analyzes three
theories behind the changes in Cuba through the lens of globalization
and presents lessons regarding globalization learned from the case
study of Cuba. Ultimately, while Cuba may decide to implement an
economic system that mirrors Maoist China or neoliberal policies
favored by the West, this implementation is not required by
globalization, leaving open the question of whether it is plausible for a
country to selectively engage globalization on its own terms or whether
globalization is so pervasive a force as to preclude such an option; the
final part of this paper presents guidelines to help Cuba successfully
globalize in a way consistent with its ideology.
I. BACKGROUND: PRINCIPLES OF GLOBALIZATION, CUBA, AND THE 2004
ANALYSIS
To truly understand the potential economic upheaval awaiting
Cuba, it is first crucial to fully grasp the concept of globalization and its
relationship with Cuban economic reform. As such, this part shall
explore background information with respect to the general principles of
globalization and the history of Cuba's economy and give a brief
overview and an analysis of Larry CatA Backer's work regarding Cuba
and globalization.
A. Principles of Globalization; Globalization as Harmonization
Globalization refers to various transformative changes and
processes that permeate and unite all levels of governance, from local to
international. There are myriad ways to conceptualize the many facets
369
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of globalization: for example, as a continuum with social and economic
relations and networks for the local scale on one side and the global
scale on the other. 9 Over this continuum, human affairs link together
and expand at all levels;20 within this continuum, human affairs are
linked through various processes that transform "spatial organization of
social relations and transactions-assessed in terms of their extensity,
intensity, velocity, and impact-generating transcontinental or
interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the
exercise of power."21 Certainly, while some uniformity results from this
process, it is the linkages themselves that are the most important to our
study of globalization.
It is first critical to recognize where, within the pantheon of
globalization, this Note explores. In contrast to this Note's definition
and usage of globalization, several different theories of globalization
exist and, at one time, dominated the study of globalization. 22 TWO
overarching principles from these models should be noted in the context
of this Note. First, there is an assumption that all states must, willingly
or unwillingly, modernize 23 through linear development of industrial
economic policies. Therefore, to reach an economic level of development
to be fully modernized, a state must fulfill certain economic conditions,
such as committing itself to capital mobilization and entrepreneurship,
compromising certain societal values to allow for modern efficient
production, and increasing the standard of living and mass
consumption.24 Second, from this assumption, it follows that, as
economic modernization occurs, a state's society will assent to the new,
19. David Held et al., Rethinking Globalization, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS
READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 67, 67 (David Held & Anthony
McGrew eds., 2d ed. 2003).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 68.
22. See, e.g., Alexander Gerschenkron, The Early Phases of Industrialization in Russia:
Afterthoughts and Counterthoughts, in THE EcONOMICS OF TAKE-OFF INTO SUSTAINED
GROWTH 151, 151-69 (W.W. Rostow ed., 1963); W.W. Rostow, Preface to the Third Edition
of W.W. RoSTow, THE STAGES OF EcONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (3d
ed. 1990).
23. See ROSTOW, supra note 22, at xxv ("[S]ocieties that deny themselves modernization
also leave themselves open to intrusion, and soon or late they may be driven to accept the
world of modern technology . . .. Contemporary countries that have not yet entered take-
off do not, on balance, represent a group trying to fashion viable traditional societies in
revolt against the costs and distortions of modern life . . . . they all reflect failures to
achieve avowed modernizing objectives, selected after the believed costs and benefits had
been weighed.").
24. See id. at 4-11 (describing the Rostovian take-off model, which traces the linear
progression of a nation from a traditional society to the age of mass consumption); see also
Backer, supra note 7, at 352-54.
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materialistic norms that follow from modernization.25 Ultimately, the
more "backward" a state's economy is in comparison to the modern,
industrialist economy, the more certain it is that particular conditions
must be fulfilled for development and change. 26
These antiquated, simplistic models of globalization are vestiges of a
"one world," homogenous view of global economic interaction. However,
as time has progressed, it is clear that neither globalization nor global
economic engagement requires uniformity and conformity of states.
Whereas this Note asserts that global economic engagement does not
require homogenization of economic and societal values but is infinitely
flexible and can accommodate different models of engagement, these
other theories of globalization avow that globalization can only function
in a singular model and that states, which desire to engage in the global
economy, must conform to that singular model, thus precluding the
possibility of an ideological state, such as Cuba, from inclusion and
engagement.
While a one world model precludes the role of the state, instead
focusing on uniformity in economic progress and policy in all nations,
it is clear that this is an inaccurate assessment of the role of the state
in a globalized world. Instead, the state continues to play a role-
albeit reconfigured to remain in power-in the globalized world.
Indeed, state power is "decentered"27 in an interconnected world, as
problems and global actors are increasingly transterritorial, 28 and yet,
states are not sidelined in the global scheme. States are required to
engage with other global actors-other states, world organizations,
and transnational corporations-in the decision-making process. The
decision-making process is no longer made in a vacuum by a wholly
sovereign body.
While it is undisputed that all state decision-making is influenced,
to some extent, by other global actors, the manner in which states
choose to engage the global community varies. Indeed, no state is
25. See id. at 9 ("The society makes such terms as it will with the requirements of
modern efficient production, balancing off the new against the older values and
institutions, or revising the latter in such ways as to support rather than to retard the
growth process.").
26. See Gerschenkron, supra note 22, at 151-69 (describing the six degrees of
backwardness and how each distinctly impacted the development of the economy).
Gerschenkron depicts the "great spurt" that backwards countries experience as (1) a
sudden and rapid increase in the rate of manufacturing growth and (2) a continuation of
that growth through a period of international depression. Id. at 163.
27. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the
Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 769,
772 (1998).
28. Id.
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immune from globalization, no matter how resistant it may be to
dominant models of globalization, for globalization infuses and
permeates all levels of society and government through linkages.
Therefore, one may consider globalization as:
[Tihe intensification of worldwide social relations which
link distant localities in such a way that local
happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles
away and vice versa . . . . Local transformation is as
much of a part of globalization as the lateral extension of
social connections across time and space. 29
Through all of these relations and linkages, although they vary by state,
the reconfiguration of the state as a global actor allows it to remain in
power by the way in which it chooses to globalize.
Ultimately, states retain their importance, even in a decentralized,
globalized economy, as the linkage and permeation of governments,
cultures, and countries do not necessarily lead to mindless uniformity in
policy making. Instead, globalization provides incentives for states to
harmonize their policies with others in the global economy and to
"achieve some level of concordance with other legal systems."0 In this
context, globalization decentralizes the very policies and theoretical
underpinnings of governments allowing for concordance between
nations that contain vastly different ideologies,31 as with the United
States and China. Globalization may change the way in which states
make decisions, but it is the state itself that implements its policies; 32 a
role remains for states within a globalized world, albeit in a different
form.33
Rather than the linear, uniform models of one world globalization,
the reconfigured state may globalize in its own way. All said, Cuba is a
fascinating case study in the role of the globalizing state, for, despite the
ideological reasons why Cuba would remain isolated, it instead is
globalizing and doing so by its own model.
29. Anthony Giddens, The Globalizing of Modernity, in THE GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 60, 60
(David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2003).
30. Backer, supra note 7, at 354.
31. See id.
32. See Aman, supra note 27, at 803 (asserting that market economies are not
motivated by the difficulties involved with regulation but rather by an affirmative decision
by the state to reimpose a laissez-faire economy).
33. See, e.g., id. at 782.
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B. Cuba
The Republic of Cuba, located in the Caribbean Sea, is home to 11.2
million people and, since January 1, 1959, is the first Communist
government in the Western Hemisphere.34 Cuba stands as an anomaly
in much of the world, as its geographical location, an island, allows it to
be one of the most isolationist countries in the world. For the first part
of Cuba's history under the Cuban Communist Party, it received
support from and maintained relations with the Soviet Union, until its
fall in 1991." As a result of the loss of Soviet support, the Cuban
economy suffered, and its GDP declined by thirty-five percent between
1990 and 1993; this suffering was compounded by the ideological and
geographical isolation of Cuba from the global community.3 6 Although
liberal reforms implemented between 1993 and 2003 opened up certain
economic and cultural relationships with the global community, Cuba
has resisted many of the modern trends of the remainder of the world.37
Currently, Cuba's economy navigates troubled waters. Statistically,
the 2009 GDP is officially estimated at $51.01 billion, and the GDP per
capita is $4,545.00;38 the current monthly wage is around $19.00;'9 and
the average nominal salary from 2000 to 2007 increased twice as much
as productivity.40 The Cuban government remains the largest employer
of the five million person workforce, with the state employing about
eighty-three percent of the workforce, and another five percent of the
labor force employed by state-connected cooperatives.41 Meanwhile, the
private workforce remains stunted, employing a mere twelve percent of
the population, with self-employment constituting three percent-a
mere 142,000 individuals-of the total workforce. 42 In addition to the
large burden of being the country's main employer, the Cuban state also
faces economic concerns regarding its lack of productivity, as sixty
percent of the workforce is in a non-productive sector and as imports are
equivalent to four times the value of exports.43 Beyond economic
34. Background Note: Cuba, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/
paleilbgn/2886.htm; Cuba Country Profile, BBC News (Nov. 30, 2011), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hilamericas/country-profiles/1203299.stm#facts.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Joaquin P. Pujol, The Cuban Economy in a World of Uncertainty, 19 CUBA IN
TRANSITION 1, 3 (2009).
40. Id. at 2.
41. Background Note: Cuba, supra note 34.
42. Id.
43. Id.; Pujol, supra note 39, at 2.
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stagnation, other economic changes include those caused by the United
States embargo," "lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum
costs, devastating hurricanes in 2001, 2004, and 2008, a major drought
in the eastern half of the island, increasing external debt, and stagnant
or decreasing agricultural and industrial productivity,"45 all of which
ultimately result in a bleak economic outlook for Cuba.46
Due to these economic struggles, the Cuban economy is weak; as the
GDP falls, the deficit grows and the government increasingly depends
on food and energy imports and the service sector, all of which is
dependent and reliant on international cooperation.47 Additionally, the
continued United States economic embargo against Cuba stifles
potential economic growth, despite calls by the international community
for it to be lifted.48 Recently, leaked confidential U.S. diplomatic cables
predicted that Cuba's economic and financial situation could be "fatal"
by 2012 or 2013 due to the global financial crisis and foreign debt.49 It is
clear that economic change is necessary if Cuba is to remain afloat; it is
equally clear that such changes have begun.
C. Cuba and Globalization: Larry Catd Backer, 2004
In 2004, Larry Cati Backer published "Cuban Corporate Governance
at the Crossroads: Cuban Marxism, Private Economic Collectives, and
Free Market Globalism," a piece that considered whether Cuba could
globalize economically while remaining ideologically committed to a
44. See Overwhelming Majority of Nations Reiterate Their Rejection of the Blockade
Against Cuba, GRANMA INT'L (Cuba) (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.granma.culingles/news-
i/26octubre-43rechazo.html (estimating that the U.S. embargo on Cuba has generated
losses worth $751,363 billion since its enactment).
45. Background Note: Cuba, supra note 34.
46. See Pujol, supra note 39, at 3 (citing the statistic that Cuba imports more than
eighty percent of its food supply).
47. Joaquin P. Pujol, "Cuba at the Crossroads in 21st Century" The Cuban Economy as
Seen by Economists Within the Island and Other Observers, UNI6N LIBERAL CUBANA,
www.cubaliberal.org/economialpdfs/Cubaneconomyin21st.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2011)
(citing Cuba's reliance in trade upon Venezuela).
48. For example, in 2010, a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly called for
the embargo to be lifted; it passed for the nineteenth consecutive year with a vote of 187 to 2.
Neil MacFarquhar, Assembly Again Urges U.S. to Lift Cuba Embargo, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 27,
2010, at A8; see also G.A. Res. 65/41, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/L.3 (Oct. 14, 2010); In Annual Vote,
General Assembly Calls for Lifting United States Embargo Against Cuba, U.N. NEWS CENTRE
(Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=36567&Cr-Cuba&Cr1.
49. Jens Erik Gould, Cuba's Economy May Become 'Fatal' in 2 Years, U.S. Cable Says,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2010, 3:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-10/cuba-
debt-load-may-become-fatal-to-economy-in-two-years-u-s-cable-says.html.
374
HARMONIZATION, BUT NOT HOMOGENIZATION
Marxist-Leninist philosophy.o In his analysis, Backer considers whether
the Cuban model could enter the global market in a manner similar to
that used by the Chinese.s' Ultimately, Backer concludes that
globalization is necessary for the future of Cuba,s2 but that it cannot
happen, even in a manner similar to China's, without fundamental
changes to the Cuban ideology and structure of governance.
Backer's analysis of the Cuban economy starts with the
understanding that globalization is essential 3 and inevitable for Cuba,
despite its best attempts to resist.5 4 Based upon this understanding, he
then considers whether Cuba could globalize in a manner similar to a
successful Communist state: China. China's "controlled" engagement
with the global economy, begun in 1978, experienced much success,
starting especially in the 1990s" when the government blended together
Maoism with liberalized economic policies making "it possible for Maoist
China to embrace globalization without losing the state's basic Maoist
character." China's system has enjoyed obvious success as a "socialist
market economy," a system that propelled China to the third-largest
economy in the world in 2010, with a sustained economic growth of
almost ten percent for almost three decades.57 Despite the strengths and
successes of the Chinese hybrid system, it does not necessarily translate
to success in Cuba.
Although it is tempting to analogize China's success to Cuba's due to
common Communist underpinnings, Backer contends that Maoism is
not the "Fidelismo" of Cuba and that significant differences exist
between the two countries. To begin, today's world vastly differs from
that of the beginning of the Cuban revolution, as globalization
harmonizes the policies of the majority of the world; while the Chinese
government embraced the "free enterprise entity-based
bureaucratism"59 and was received eagerly by the world without
requiring change,60 Backer contends that Fidelismo does not embrace
50. Backer, supra note 7, at 338.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 411 ("It is unlikely that Cuba will be able to resist the globalization
consensus for long. Global harmonization produces pressures that nations like Cuba may
find difficult to resist.").
53. Id. at 364 (explaining that "failure to adhere to the new orthodoxy of globalization .
can mean exclusion from the global community.").
54. See id. at 408-09.
55. See id. at 380, 388.
56. Id. at 386.
57. Background Note: China, U.S. DEPT. STATE (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/
paleilbgn/18902.htm.
58. See Backer, supra note 7, at 385.
59. Id. at 396.
60. Id. at 399.
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such ideals and, moreover, that the West would not be so welcoming
without demanding compromise.
Following his analysis, Backer described several changes that would
be necessary for Cuba to embrace globalization. The first is to
decentralize the state from the economy, as was done in China, and to
integrate Cuba into the global economy. 62 The second is a change of the
country's leadership from Fidel Castro, whom Backer described as
fervently committed to the Marxist-Leninist philosophy, to Ra6l Castro;
the failure to do this would result in a lack of change in the government,
as elites are unwilling to change, and an increased possibility of
instability.63 Finally, Backer suggests that Cuba must re-evaluate its
original vision of governance, perhaps adopting a more market-based
approach, as capitalism, which, in the words of Lenin, "compels all
nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production
.... In one word, it creates a world after its own image."" Only through
a "shift of focus" does Baker believe that Cuba can globalize as it must
while still retaining its Marxist-Leninist philosophy.s
II. FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN CUBA AND THE WORLD SINCE 2004
Despite Backer's assertion that Cuba, as a state, must relinquish its
power and conform to a prevalent form of engagement, such as
capitalism, Cuba has since shown that it will globalize without doing so.
Instead, Cuba is a global actor by its own choice, without withering as a
state, and by creating its own model of engagement in conformance with
its ideology. Indeed, Cuba cannot and will not resist globalization; it must
globalize to survive. And yet, while Cuba globalizes, it does so in its own
manner, in accordance with its own history, culture, and ideology.
A. Changes in Cuba
1. The Rise of Ratl: Changes from 2004 to 2011
Even before the announcement of the sixth National Congress of the
Communist Part of Cuba and the economic reform, other major changes
61. See id. at 385, 399 (describing how "Cuba could not remain true to its Stalinist
principles and permit the creation of entities or juridical persons with independent control
over fundamental attributes of state power").
62. See id. at 413.
63. See id. at 417.
64. Id. at 404 (citing Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in THE
MARX-ENGELS READER 338-39 (1972)).
65. See id. at 414-17.
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occurred over the previous seven years in Cuban policy-many of which
precede the current economic proposals and provide context to the ever-
changing and globalizing world surrounding Cuban decision-making.
The accession of Rail Castro as president, following Fidel Castro's
illness in July 2006, marked the beginning of open acknowledgement of
the struggling Cuban economy and a call for "open debate" regarding
"structural and conceptual changes" that needed to occur.66 Within the
first few years of Rafl's presidency, changes allowed Cubans to embrace
limited forms of consumerism by purchasing mobile phones and staying
in tourist hotels67 and to increase autonomy by permitting private
farmers to buy supplies and equipment to increase the use of land.6 8
Although the initial reforms seem minor, larger reforms followed in
2008, as the Cuban government implemented new policies that
expanded access to public land for farming, increased wages, raised the
retirement age, and modernized the infrastructure of transportation.
Many of the changes implemented and issues raised for debate by
Ra6l Castro show the vast differences between his leadership and
philosophy with that of Fidel Castro. To begin, Ra6l Castro's role as the
former defense minister,0 the most profitable state agency,7 lends itself
to an entirely different manner of governance, one in which Castro
"takes the view that Cuba can no longer afford the bloated and
paternalistic state he inherited from Fidel, and the state's payroll
should be linked to productivity."7 Included in Castro's goal for
increased productivity are a restructuring of the economy, a reduction in
spending on universal education and healthcare, phasing out ration
book to be replaced with targeted help, and "granting wide autonomy to
state companies" with expectations that they will "pay their own way-
and [be] liquidated if they do not," and can "set up joint ventures with
foreign companies" to create jobs. These changes, while marking
change in Cuba, show the Cuban state reconfiguring itself, albeit out of
necessity, to remain an actor within the globalized world. Although
changes exist, they are done in the context and by the power of the
66. Radl's Talking Cure, supra note 12.
67. Big Brother's Shadow: Radl Castro Preaches Patience, EcONOMIST, July 31, 2008,
http://www.economist.com/node/11848468?story-id=11848468.
68. See id.
69. Background Note: Cuba, supra note 34.
70. Trying to Make the Sums Add Up, EcoNOMIST, Nov. 11, 2010,
http://www.economist.com/node/17463421.
71. See id. (revealing that according to Rail's son-in-law, a military colonel, an armed
forces holding company, called "GAESA," arguably controls up to forty percent of the
Cuban economy).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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Cuban government, not in accordance with the U.S. or Chinese model of
state engagement.
2. The Turning Point: The Sixth National Congress of the
Communist Party of Cuba and Economic Reform
In November 2010, Ra6l Castro announced that Cuba would hold
the sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba in April
2011, after a fourteen-year hiatus, to "make fundamental decisions on
how to modernize the Cuban economic model and adopt the paths for
economic and social policy of the party and the revolution."74 In addition
to the announcement, the Cuban government released the "Economic
and Social Policy Development Project" (Proyecto de Lineamientos de la
Politica Econ6mica y Social del Partido y la Revoluci6n), a thirty-two
page booklet that presents the government's plans.75 The ultimate aim
of these reforms is, in the words of Rail Castro, to prevent Cuba from
falling "off a cliff' due to economic disaster. More specifically, the plan
intends "to boost exports and reduce reliance on imports, and to unify
Cuba's twin currencies of worthless domestic pesos and stronger
'convertible' ones."n
The specific points of the plan include an economic management
model and policies for macroeconomics, foreign affairs, science,
technology and innovation, health, education and employment,
agribusiness, industry and energy, tourism, transportation, housing and
water resources, and trade.78 Despite the wide range of changes to be
implemented and mounting commentary that such "bold changes . . .
may herald the beginning of [Cuban communism's] end,"79 the plan
itself states that "[t]he economic policy in this new phase will follow the
principle that socialism is the only way to overcome our difficulties and
74. Cuba to Hold Party Congress to Chart Path for Economy, supra note 3.
75. See Cuban People to Discuss Economic and Social Policy Development Project,
GRANMA INT'L (Cuba) (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.granma.culingles/cuba-i/9noviembre-
Cuban%20people.html; Nick Miroff, Cuba's Rescue Plan Opens Doors to Market Reform,
NPR (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/1118/131413123/cuba-s-rescue-plan-opens-
doors-to-market-reforms.
76. Miroff, supra note 75.
77. Trying to Make the Sums Add Up, supra note 70.
78. PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CUBA, PROYECTO DE LINEAMIENTOS DE LA POLITICA
EcoN6MICA Y SOCIAL DEL PARTIDO (2010) [hereinafter PROYECTO DE LINEAMIENTOS],
available at http://www.prensa-latina.culDossiers/ProyectoLineamientosPCC.pdf.
79. Radl the Pragmatist, supra note 18.
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preserve the gains of the Revolution, and that as we update our
economic model, planning will be paramount, not the market."80
In addition to the plan, the Cuban government, the largest employer
in the nation, declared its intention to lay off over one million workers;
by April 1, 2011, 500,000 Cubans were scheduled to lose their jobs, to be
followed by another 800,000 workers before 2013.81 Eventually, "up to
two-in-five Cubans will no longer work for the state."82 When compared
to the current level of self-employment, which is at about 143,00083 of
the 11.2 million citizens,8 the magnitude and significance of the layoffs
is better understood.
In place of government employment, the government encourages
citizens to seek self-employment or create co-operatives with others"-a
shocking development for a country that, for the last forty years, has not
allowed citizens to employ other Cubans, as it is considered exploitation
by the Cuban Constitution to have a non-family "employee."86 The 178
government-approved forms of self-employment include eighty-three
professions in which non-relative employees may be hired and twenty-
nine previously unauthorized professions and consist of a wide range of
professions, including food vendors, sports trainers, stonemasons,
bookkeepers, auto body workers, and other various trades.87 In exchange
for working in the private sector, the self-employed will pay taxes
ranging from twenty-five to fifty percent of their personal income.88
The changes proposed by Cuba differ markedly from those of the
past,8 raising questions about the future trajectory of this reform. This
is especially so if Cuba eventually becomes a hybrid or market-based
80. PROYECTO DE LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 78, at 7 ("La politica econ6mica en la
nueva etapa se corresponderi con el principio de que s6lo el socialismo es capaz de vencer
las dificultades y preservar las conquistas de la Revoluci6n, y que en la actualizaci6n del
modelo econ6mico, primar la planificaci6n y no el mercado.").
81. Radl the Pragmatist, supra note 18.
82. Id.
83. Cuba Starts Process of Reform in 2010, XINIHUA NEWS (Nov. 24, 2010, 4:30 PM),
http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.comlenglish2OlO/business/2010-
11/24/c 13620651.htm.
84. Background Note: Cuba, supra note 34.
85. Trying to Make Sums Add Up, supra note 70.
86. Id.
87. Leticia Martinez Herndndez, The Self-Employed Sector: Much More than an
Alternative, GRANMA INT'L (Cuba) (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.granma.culingles/cuba-
i/27septiembre-3acpropia-a.html.
88. Cuba Sets Out Rules and Taxes for Self-Employed Workers, BBC NEWS (Oct. 26,
2010, 5:02 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11625472.
89. See Hernindez, supra note 87 (explaining the reforms are "also an attempt . .. to
distance [Cubans] from those concepts that almost condemned self-employment to
extinction and stigmatized those who decided to legally join that sector in the 1990s").
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economy. Despite such conjecture, the Cuban government remains
committed to its Marxist-Leninist roots; in the words of Marino Murillo
Jorge, the Cuban Economic and Planning Minister, "[t]here is no
reform, it is an update of the economic model. No one thinks that we are
going to turn over property: we are going to administer it in another
way.""o Juan Triana, an economist at the University of Havana, declared
these economic reforms are the most important for Cuba since 1975,
because "[i]t reaffirms the revolutionary essence of our political system,
but changes the philosophy of our economic management."1 Ultimately,
the Cuban government, out of necessity, aims to restructure its
economic system to increase the now-lacking productivity and efficiency
that continue to plague the country and to counterbalance many
fundamental benefits provided by the Cuban government, including free
health care and education, all within the context of its current political
ideology.92 As such, Cuba remains resolute in its resistance to the
predominant models of globalization, and due to the flexibility of
globalization, it will be able to do so.
B. Global Changes
In addition to massive changes to the Cuban economic model, other
changes around the world occurred that undoubtedly affected the Cuban
policies, including the economic crisis that peaked in 2008.9'
Additionally, the election of Barack Obama ushered in a possible era of
improved relations with Cuba, as the President commented that he
looked forward to "a new era of partnership."94 This resulted in policies
that eased travel restrictions to Cuba by Cuban Americans and
limitations on the importation of food and medicine to Cuba and travel
to Cuba to sell goods.95 Although these changes occurred, the United
States blockade against Cuba remains, and most likely will continue to
90. Cuba Starts Process of Reform in 2010, supra note 83.
91. Miroff, supra note 75.
92. Patricia Grogg, Cubans Queue Up for Copies of New Self-Employment Rules, IPS
NEWS (Oct. 26, 2010), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=53299.
93. See generally Shares Hit By Recession Worries, BBC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2008, 10:57
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/7688202.stm (describing the extent of economic
loss worldwide).
94. Obama's New Cuba Policy, CBS NEWS (June 26, 2009, 5:11 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/19/politics/politico/main4954987.shtml.
95. Brian Montopoli, Congress Eases Cuba Travel Restrictions, CBS NEWS (Mar. 11,
2009, 11:25 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-4858977-503544.html; see
also Mark Memmott, Visitors to Cuba from U.S. on Pace Not Seen Since the 50's, NPR
(Dec. 14, 2010, 3:28 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2010/12/14/132057364/
visitors-to-cuba-from-u-s-on-pace-not-seen-since-the-50s.
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remain until Cuba becomes more "democratic,"96 despite pressure from
the United Nations General Assembly, 97 members of the United States
Congress, 98 and even the U.S. public" to end the decades-old embargo.
Indeed, in the face of positive gains that promise better ties with Cuba
in the future, Radl Castro deemed the changes "fine"100 and claimed that
the embargo remains without political or moral justification and that
Cuba is unwilling "to negotiate our sovereignty nor our political and
social system, and our right to self-determination and internal
affairs."' 1 As such, Cuba remains resistant to the capitalist model of
engagement espoused by the United States.
In addition to increased pressure to fully harmonize Cuba with the
global market through changes in United States-Cuban policy, another
important development in the context of globalization is the growth of
the Chinese economy. China has been growing by an average of more
than ten percent per year for the last ten years; it is the world's third-
largest economy 02 and has strengthened its links to Cuba's economy, as
evidenced by trade and commercial ties between the two countries.' 03
Yet, Cuba is not following any one model; instead, this engagement by
Cuba as a global actor is dispositive of the flexibility of globalization.
III. GLOBALIZATION AND CHANGE IN CUBA
As Cuba trends against some scholars' expectations, the focus now
shifts to the reasons behind Cuba's policies, the role of globalization in
Cuba's decisions, and what this teaches us about globalization and the
role of the state. Finally, this paper puts forth three essential tenets to
96. See Obama Eases Cuba Travel Restrictions, CNN (Apr. 13, 2008, 4:25 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/13/cuba.travel.
97. See MacFarquhar, supra note 48.
98. Obama Eases Cuba Travel Restrictions, supra note 96 (noting a bill sponsored by
several Senators, including Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) and Byron Dorgan (D-North
Dakota), to lift the travel ban against Cuba).
99. Id. (citing CNN poll that "seventy-one percent of Americans think that the United
States should re-establish diplomatic relations" and sixty-four percent support lifting the
travel ban for all Americans entirely).
100. Will Weissert, Raul Castro: Obama's Cuba Policy Changes 'Minimal', GUARDIAN
(Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8481185.
101. Id.
102. Shamim Adam, China to Exceed U.S. by 2020, Standard Chartered Says,
BLOOMBERG Bus. WK. (Nov. 14, 2010, 11:53 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/
2010-11-14/china-to-exceed-u-s-by-2020-standard-chartered-says.html.
103. See China, Cuba Vow to Push Forward Ties to New High, XINHUA NEWS (Nov. 24,
2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english20lO/china/2010-11/24/c_13620895.htm; Cuba
Inspired by China's Economic Reform, supra note 14.
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the Cuban ideology that must be reaffirmed and used as guidance as
Cuba controls its entry into globalized society.
A. Theories for Change
Cuba is changing its economic policies, and this change marks a
turning point in Cuban economic policy in the past half-century. It is
equally clear that the driving forces of these policies are both internal
and external, as Cuba struggles with pressures from the outside global
market, natural disasters, and foreign relations while coping with
increasing domestic problems of inefficiency, scarcity of resources, and
political change within its own borders. Truly, the changes occurring in
Cuba are a result of globalization, as external processes and internal
forces transform Cuba and, at the same time, as Cuba participates in
the transformation process itself in its implementation of new policies.
In response to the proposed economic reforms, several theories
emerged with explanations for the true reason for Cuba's policies. As
previously stated, Cuba is a different state; it would seem natural for
Cuba to be immune to global pressure. Yet, Cuba finds its own ways to
globalize. Although the explanations put forth by various commentators
present an incomplete analysis of changes that, while significant,
remain firmly attached to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, these
explanations, when presented in the context of globalization, illuminate
both the Cuban policies and the continued evolution of globalization,
presenting another generation of globalization.'m While the three
theories presented here-(1) that Cuba globalizes out of necessity; (2)
that Cuba globalizes to prepare its government for the post-Castro
transition; and (3) that Cuba globalizes due to internal pressure-each
fails to provide a complete explanation for the Cuban economic reforms;
they illustrate generally the role of the state as an actor in a globalized
world.
1. Cuba Globalizes Out of Necessity
This first theory for change is that Cuba, rather than readily doing
so of its own free will, globalizes out of pure necessity. As previously
104. Here, I mean another generation of globalization in the context of globalization
itself, evolving as the states themselves globalize; that is, globalization changes with time,
with world events, too. This is not to be confused with the terms coined by Thomas
Friedman-Globalization 1.0, 2.0, 3.0-as Friedman's terms are specific to different,
specific changes in the understanding of globalization. See THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE
WORLD is FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 10 (2d rev. and
expanded ed. Picador 2007) (2005).
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discussed, the current economic state of Cuba is dire, leading some to
argue that Cuba enacts these changes due to its economic distress after
years spent as a "bloated and paternalistic state." 5 Under this theory,
Cuba adopts a more efficient and streamlined economy because of its
past failure rather than out of true enthusiasm for reform, marking a
doctrinal turning point for Cuba. 06
Another argument is that Cuba is globalizing because of pressure
from China,.a close political and economic ally,'07 over Cuba's struggles
to repay debt.'08 Looking to the similarities between potential reforms
and those used in International Monetary Fund bail outs,'09 it could be
argued that pressure from China to improve Cuba's waning economy
drives the adoption of reforms, perhaps leading to the gradual adoption
of a system similar to that of China's market socialism.
Although these theories argue that Cuba is becoming more market-
based and less based in Fidelismo, they are understood more
appropriately as the acknowledgment by Cuba that it no longer can
remain isolationist in a globalized world. Additionally, while it seems
that Cuba is eager to learn from the Chinese experience,"o it does not
appear that Cuba globalizes its economy or mirrors the Chinese hybrid
system simply to motivate China to "further loosen|] its purse
strings.""' In the context of globalization, these changes are a result of
global harmonization"l2 with common practices, rather than an
acknowledgment of ideological defeat, and they reiterate that the state,
even while resistant to predominant models of globalization, can
refigure itself to globalize in its own model.
105. Trying to Make the Sums Add Up, supra note 70.
106. Id. ("Rad1 Castro and his allies have clearly won [the debate], against the more
doctrinaire officials promoted by Fidel Castro after he abandoned the limited opening of
the 1990s.").
107. See Cuba Inspired by China's Economic Reform, supra note 14 ('[W]ith the fall of the
Soviet Union [Cuba] drew closer to Beijing, which in 2009 was the main supplier of consumer
and manufactured goods to the Caribbean island."); Marc Frank, Cuba Bows to Pressure to
Reform its Economy, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2010, 5:32 PM), httpJ/www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e6fc6374-
06d9-lleO-8c29-00144feabdcO.html#axzzl8glVONo5 (referring to China's status as Cuba's
second largest creditor).
108. Frank, supra note 107 (citing analysis that Cuba's debt exceeds $21 billion dollars,
which is close to fifty percent of gross domestic product and Cuba's rescheduling of its
debt); see also Cuba to Restructure Its External Debt with China, LA DEMAJAGUA (Dec. 21,
2010, 10:18 AM), http://www.lademajagua.co.culingles/index.php/cuba-news/1673-cuba-to-
restructure-its-external-debt-with-china.
109. Frank, supra note 107.
110. Id. (quoting a Cuban official that "Cuba is prepared to take advantage of China's
experience in developing reform and opening up").
111. Id.
112. Backer, supra note 7, at 411 ("Global harmonization produces pressures that
nations like Cuba may find difficult to resist.").
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2. Cuba Globalizes to Prepare Its Government for the Post-Castro
Transition
Another theory looks to the age of the Cuban government as a
motivation for the changes, perhaps arguing that the aging13 Castro
brothers are preparing their country for transition into a new economic
model after their deaths.1 4 With Fidel, the backbone of Cuban
isolationism, no longer in power, perhaps Ra6l, the more open-minded,
pragmatic ruler, aims to institute reforms to prepare for the inevitable
death of the revolutionary leaders. In addition to aging leaders, there is
also the concern of aging ideas and whether the Cuban model is
outdated and in need of updating.
Backer emphasizes that the Cuban "vocabulary has become
increasingly antiquated, even by Marxist-Leninist standards,"
something that led to isolation even amongst Communist states such as
China and Vietnam." 5 Although in 2004 it seemed that Cuba was
"increasingly unable or unwilling to understand changes in other
Marxist-Leninist states,""'6 today, it seems that Cuba is admittedly
willing to "take advantage" of the reforms of other Communist
countries.' and has opened the opportunity for dialogue regarding the
possible benefits or shortcomings of the Chinese system as applied to
Cuba. Moreover, while the influence of other Communist states that
utilize a hybrid system may provide guidance, Cuba remains committed
to socialism as it implements changes"8 and insists that Cuba is not
copying any other models in its reforms."
Within the context of globalization, concerns regarding the aging
leadership and outdated economic policies obviously influence Cuban
policies, so they may be harmonized better with the global market. In
addition, Cuba's close relationship with China may partially influence
how Cuba chooses to update its policies. Cuba is reforming its
113. Fidel Castro is 84 years old and Radl Castro is 79 years old as of 2010. Profile: Raul
Castro, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2011, 11:10 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hil5234790.stm.
114. See Trying to Make the Sums Add Up, supra note 70 ("So are the Castro brothers,
in the twilight of their lives, preparing to lead Cuba towards a mixed economy, similar to
that of China?").
115. Backer, supra note 7, at 406.
116. Id.
117. Frank, supra note 107 (quoting a Cuban official that "Cuba is prepared to take
advantage of China's experience in developing reform and opening up").
118. PROYECTO DE LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 78, at 6 ("[S]61o el socialismo es capaz de
vencer las dificultades y preservar las conquistas de la Revoluci6n" (Socialism is the only
way to overcome our difficulties and preserve the gains of the Revolution).).
119. Radl's Talking Cure, supra note 12.
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admittedly antiquated policies1 20 in order to withstand a change in
power; in doing so, it will remain a powerful actor in its emerging global
economy. In short, to succeed, the government must continue to bring
Cuba into the global market so that it may continue to strengthen its
links with other countries, organizations, and networks, yet, in doing so,
the government must also choose the manner and mode of global
engagement.
3. Cuba Globalizes Due to Internal Pressure
A final presented theory is that the economic reforms merely
legalize already-existing informal private enterprises that were
formerly prohibited.121 While it could be argued that this reason
undercuts the legitimacy of the decision or shows the weakness of the
Cuban government, in the context of globalization, internal pressures
are an acknowledged, powerful force in the decision-making process of
the state. Internal pressures, whether based on linkages between
citizens down the street or across the world, influence the decision-
making of a state as much as forces from other states or international
groups. 122
In Cuba, there has long been internal criticism of "the centralizing,
state-monopolistic, and bureaucratized form of Marxist-Leninism
represented by Stalinist Cuba." 23 Dissent, even where citizens have
limited access to the Internet' 24 and freedom of assembly,125 and actions
taken by citizens, such as Cuban emigration due to a lack of earning
potential,126 is a forceful internal, globalizing pressure that the Cuban
government must and will address through its decision-making process.
Rather than weakening, due to this pressure, the Cuban state evolves
itself into an involved global actor.
120. HernAndez, supra note 87 ('[The reforms are] also an attempt . . . to distance
ourselves from those concepts that almost condemned self-employment to extinction and
stigmatized those who decided to legally join that sector in the 1990s.").
121. Trying to Make the Sums Add Up, supra note 70 ("One way of interpreting the
changes is that rather than creating new opportunities, they merely legalise what was
already a widespread informal economy of clandestine private enterprise.").
122. See Held et al., supra note 19, at 67-68.
123. Backer, supra note 7, at 412.
124. Background Note: Cuba, supra note 34 ("[Alccess to the Internet is strictly
controlled. . . .").
125. Id. ("The law punishes unauthorized assembly of more than three persons.").
126. Rory Carroll, Cuba Suffers Exodus of the Best and the Brightest as Economy
Remains in the Doldrums, GUARDIMN (May 8, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2010/may/09/cuba-raul-castro-emigration (noting that "[y]oung people, especially well-
educated professionals, are fleeing the island").
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B. Globalization: the Cause and the Answer
Ultimately, all of the forces found in these theories make it difficult
for a state like Cuba to resist change, as predicted by Larry Cati
Backer.127 Moreover, globalization itself accounts for all of these
changes-it is both the transformative trigger and the answer to Cuba's
motivation to reform. From a case study of Cuba, a historically resistant
country, the overwhelmingly unavoidable nature of globalization
becomes obvious; in the words of Fidel Castro, globalization is an
"inevitable phenomenon."l 28 However, the mere fact that globalization is
inescapable for Cuba does not mean that Cuba must change its
ideological basis or goals in order to globalize; Castro conditioned his
declaration by saying that globalization was not inevitable if it was an
imposition of neoliberal globalization. 129 Today, under the leadership of
Ratil Castro, it is clear that, contrary to Backer's 2004 prediction, a
fundamental change of ideology is not a requisite for Cuban reform.130
Instead, Cuba changes its economy within the context and the
understanding of its own Marxist-Leninist goals, rather than mirroring
the Chinese or the neoliberal forms of globalization.
The very fact that Cuba is reluctant to globalize or is not globalizing
for altruistic, market-based reasons does not negate the significance of
its reforms. Indeed, the importance of the reforms is that Cuba, as a
state, decides to implement changes, albeit in a new model, to remain in
power and to engage the global economy. Moreover, in the context of
globalization, the fact that these changes are not accompanied with
fundamental changes to the Cuban Marxist-Leninist framework is an
even stronger argument that global harmonization does not require
ideological homogenization, linear changes, or a simplistic one world
model. Globalization is infinitely flexible, complex, and diverse.
Globalization in today's world no longer requires homogenization;
Cuba does not need to either adopt a neoliberal or Maoist version of
economics to globalize. Instead, it can remain Marxist-Leninist while
entering into the global economy. Just as neoliberal policies are not the
127. Backer, supra note 7, at 411-12 ("Together, these forces are difficult to resist for
states that are small, poor, of and in a technologically inferior position.").
128. FIDEL CASTRO, CAPITALISM IN CRISIS: GLOBALIZATION AND WORLD POLITIcS TODAY
46 (David Deutschmann ed., 2000).
129. Id. at 101.
130. Larry Cati Backer, Cuba Responds to Globalizationand [sic] Reorganizes Its
Political Economy, L. END DAY (Sept. 24, 2010, 7:09 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2010/09/cuba-respondes-to-globalization-opening.html ("[T]he great changes to the Cuban
political economy assumes a coherent shape that is hardly revolutionary or that otherwise
points to a rejection of its current framework. This is change at the margins, even if
understood as significant within the framework of Cuban political thinking.").
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only concept of globalization, as seen in China, so too Chinese Maoism is
not the only alternative form of globalization. The fundamental
differences between China and Cuba are vast-for example, the focus of
the Cuban reform differs from that of the Chinese,' 3 1 the decision by
Cuban officials to shun Chinese "market socialism" 32 in favor of limited
Communist reforms,13 3 and the histories and cultures of the two
countries differ.' 34
Cuba presents a different story of globalization-one of a nation,
rather than making an ideological change without regard to outside
circumstances, instead shifting policies out of necessity and the need to
survive in a changed world. Moreover, Cuba's story of globalization is
one of a nation attempting to limit negative effects of globalization.
Cuba, while symbolically isolated for the last sixty years, was not
immune from globalization-the country's resistance wreaked havoc
upon the economic and social growth of the nation. Instead, Cuba, as a
global actor, reconfigures itself to retain power in its new model of
global engagement. And yet, Cuba's decision to gradually reform
economic policies is not made in isolation; while Radl Castro certainly
makes the decisions, many of these decisions have already been made
for Cuba by a globalized world.
Upon review, Cuba will retain its ideological goals without
completely compromising or adhering to the other forms of
governance-this is what globalization means, the permeation of even
the most historically uncompromising country and the harmonization of
certain key ideas and practices embraced by the rest of the world.
Moreover, it shows that globalization does not stop with market-based
or neoliberal governance; instead, as Deng Xiaoping stated, "[The]
[miarket can also serve socialism."'35 Although Cuba certainly will stop
131. Id. (commenting that "[tihis is no revolution" in the Cuban policies, which, unlike
the Chinese focus on aggregation of capital or labor, focus upon large scale economics in
which the Cuban state remains a central figure).
132. See David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Spreading the Wealth, in THE GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 447, 450
(David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2d ed. 2003) (exploring the validity of the
antiglobalization movement).
133. Ratil the Pragmatist, supra note 18 ("No Cuban official has matched Deng
Xiaoping's embrace of 'market socialism', let alone his (perhaps apocryphal) injunction
that 'to get rich is glorious'.").
134. See Jiang Shixue, Chinese Acad. of Soc. Sci., Cuba's Economic Reforms in A
Chinese Perspective, Paper Presented to the Wilton Park Conference on Cuba (Oct. 2002),
available at http:/Iblog.china.com.cn/jiangshixue/art/915280.html ("[The Deng Xiaoping
Theory's] essence is to build socialism with Chinese characteristics. . . . As socialist
countries, Cuba and China should have their own values compatible to their political
system and traditional cultures.").
135. Id.
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short of embracing market socialism, it is engaging economic
globalization as a global actor.'36 The state can carve out niches for
globalization; however, the question remains how Cuba and other states
can limit the undesirable aspects of globalization-here, the neoliberal
parts-while benefitting from the harmonization of globalization.
C. Limiting Globalization-Essential Constitutional Reaffirmations
The Cuban Constitution provides a robust and resolute ideological
declaration of the fundamental Cuban tenets of governance, including
equality, dignity, and socialism.13 ' However, in light of the potential
challenges of limiting globalization to coincide with and benefit the
people and ideological basis of Cuba, it is important to reaffirm certain
essential constitutional principles relating to the economic reform; in
doing so, Cuba may help define the boundaries for globalization and
identify the ways Cuban globalization differs from that of Maoist or
neoliberal countries. While there are many important aspects of the
Cuban ideology, this paper proposes three that are so central to the very
principles of Marxist-Leninist philosophy that, in light of economic
reforms, should be explicitly reaffirmed by the Cuban government. Cuba
cannot wither as a state, nor can its economic policy undercut its core
societal values.
The first principle is that of the sovereignty of the state over the
economic activities within Cuba. According to Article Sixteen of the
Cuban Constitution, the role of the state is to organize, to direct, and to
control such economic activity to guarantee "the programmed
development of the country, to strengthen the socialist system of
satisfying the material and cultural needs of the society and citizens, to
promote the development of human beings and their dignity, [and] the
progress and the security of the country."1'3  The Cuban government
136. Rory Carroll, Capitalist Storm Clouds Loom over Havana after State Cuts 1m Jobs,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/14/cuba-
government-job-cuts-private-sector (noting Julia Sweig's analysis that "[a] hybrid is
evolving which can't be said to be any one thing .... We're seeing a uniquely Cuban
transition but within the global economy").
137. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPIfBLICA DE CUBA 2002, pmbl. ("Conscientes ... de que s6lo
en el socialismo y el comunismo, cuando el hombre ha sido liberado de todas las formas de
explotaci6n: de la esclavitud, de la servidumbre y del capitalismo, se alcanza la entera
dignidad del ser humano; y de que nuestra Revoluci6n elev6 la dignidad de la patria y del
cubano a superior altura . . . .").
138. Id. art. 16 ("El Estado organiza, dirige y controla la actividad econ6mica nacional
conforme a un plan que garantice el desarrollo programado del pais, a fin de fortalecer el
sistema socialista, satisfacer cada vez mejor las necesidades materiales y culturales de la
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must make it clear that it remains firmly in control of the economy,
including any "privatization" through self-employment; that, unlike
Chinese market-based Maoism, the government is the sole regulator of
the economy; and that the government protects the interests and dignity
of individuals and, therefore, that any "privatization" aims must serve
that same goal.
The second principle is the continued abhorrence of consumerism
and prohibition of class augmentation. Article Fourteen of the Cuban
Constitution conditions ownership of goods and land upon the principle
of equality and the prevention of exploitation of individuals.' 39 These
constitutional principles also carry into affirmative guarantees of work,
disability, social assistance, occupational protections, and health care 40
that are based upon presumptions of fairness and justice.141 Contrary to
the linear models that claim society must compromise values to
accommodate economic growth, Cuba will remain resolute. Therefore,
the Cuban government must reaffirm these ideals in the context that
globalization serves to benefit the whole, rather than to enrich a select
class; the same principles of egalitarianism upon which Cuba stands
must be reaffirmed to set apart the Cuban economic reforms from those
of Maoist or neoliberal countries.
The final principle is that Cuba must reiterate and must focus its
policies on the bedrock of the nation-socialism. As described in the
Cuban Constitution, socialism is transformative in creating a "new and
just society, [socialism] is irrevocable, and Cuba will never return to
capitalism."l42 By maintaining the view that Cuba's globalization occurs
within the larger framework of Cuba's socialist ideology, Cuba can
effectively protect itself from possible neoliberal policies that threaten
the core of its system. Cuba may globalize effectively without changing
its ideology; it must make it abundantly clear that "the only
globalization that can save humanity and preserve the human species is
sociedad y los ciudadanos, promover el desenvolvimiento de la persona humana y de su
dignidad, el avance y la seguridad del pais.").
139. Id. art. 14 ("En la Rep6blica de Cuba rige el sistema de economia basado en la
propiedad socialista de todo el pueblo sobre los medios fundamentales de producci6n y en
Is supresi6n de Is explotaci6n del hombre por el hombre. Tambidn rige el principio de
distribuci6n socialista 'de cada cual segdn su capacidad, a cada cual segdn su trabajo'.").
140. Id. arts. 47-50.
141. Id. art. 41 ("Todos los ciudadanos gozan de iguales derechos y estgn sujetos a
iguales deberes.").
142. Id. art. 3 ("El socialismo y el sistema politico y social revolucionario establecido en
esta Constituci6n, probado por aflos de heroics resistencia frente a las agresiones de todo
tipo y la guerra econ6mica de los gobiernos de la potencia imperialists mds poderosa que
ha existido y habiendo demostrado su capacidad de transformar el pais y crear una
sociedad enteramente nueva y justa, es irrevocable, y Cuba no volverA jamis al
capitalismo.").
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a socialist globalization."'4 3 Thus, Cuba allows for harmonization
essential to the maintenance of the Cuban economy without betraying
the foundational elements of the Cuban identity.
In reaffirming the central tenets of Cuba's ideology, Cuba may take
charge of its globalization and carefully guide its citizens into the global
economy without exposing itself to the possible pitfalls of neoliberal
globalization.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the available explanations for Cuban economic change-
necessity, age, and economics-fail to capture the reason for and the
significance of the Cuban economic reform. Cuba, a nation that would
seemingly resist globalization altogether, is reconfiguring itself as a
state to remain in power in a globalized world. The State of Cuba
remains ever-important to the decisions made regarding the state's
policies; for that, the predominate models of globalization cannot and
will not be implemented in Cuba. As Cuba remains in power by choosing
to globalize differently than the other models, it reveals the incredible
malleability of globalization. Globalization is not about a one world
model, nor is it about a few templates for engagement; rather it creates,
embraces, and elevates differences, linkages, and interplay between
countries.
Indeed, globalization is a powerful, transformative force that
prevents any state from remaining in isolation if it hopes to survive. It
is also a force that does not require homogenization for states to
integrate into the global community. Cuba's policies, if successful, will
provide it with the requisite stability to engage in the global economy.'
Cuban reform shows that the state, as an actor, may remain
ideologically resolute, yet alter its economy to enter into a globalized
society. Certainly, globalization does not mark the end of socialist Cuba,
but instead draws all parties in the global economy to common
engagement to succeed.
143. CASTRO, supra note 128, at 46.
144. Larry CatA Backer, Operationalizing Cuba's New Economic Model: The New
Regulations Are Published, L. END DAY (Oct. 26, 2010, 10:17 PM), http://
Icbackerblog.blogspot.com/2010/10/operationalizing-cubas-new-economic.html ("If the
Cuban government can make this work they will go a long way to achieving a measure of
stability that may withstand the impact of Cuba's reentry into the conventional global
economy.").
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